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FUNDAMENTALISM FROM THE PERSPECTIVE
OF LIBERAL TOLERANCE
Leslie C. Griffin*
"[T]he historical origin of political liberalism (and of
liberalism more generally) is the Reformation and its aftermath,
with the long controversies over religious toleration in the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries."' Liberals and liberal
theorists have never forgotten the Wars of Religion. Although the
seventeenth century "has often been called the century of reason
and genius"2 (because of Descartes, Hobbes, Corneille, Pascal,
Locke and others), Locke scholar Hans Aarsleff reminds us that:
For the vast majority of the men and women who lived in
Europe during Locke's century, the immediate reality was very
different. It was a time of violence, death, rape, war, and
devastation on a vast scale. It was years of religious strife
caused by sectarian disputes over the right reading of Scriptures
and the flaunting of royal despotism justified by the doctrine of
the divine right of kings. It was a world of constant religious
and political intolerance and repression, and of ensuing
dislocation that made fugitives wander across the lands of
Europe in search of peace and security.'
The exhaustion from these wars "eventually led to the
formulation and often reluctant acceptance of some form of the
principle of toleration."' The acceptance of toleration was
reluctant because all sides wanted their vision of the truth to
conquer their erroneous neighbors. Nonetheless, despite its
limitations, liberal tolerance brought to citizens a truce that
* Larry & Joanne Doherty Chair in Legal Ethics, University of Houston Law Center.
JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, at xxvi (1996).
2 Hans Aarsleff, Locke's influence, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO LOCKE 252,
254 (Vere Chappell ed., 1994).
3 Id. (emphasis added).
" JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 1 (Erin Kelly ed., 2001)
[hereinafter RAWLS, JUSTICE].
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religious intolerance had not provided.
Because of this history, liberals fear religious excess and
intolerance, and are prone to see it wherever fundamentalism
occurs. The preeminent proponent of liberalism, John Rawls,
identifies religion as liberalism's ongoing challenge. He asks:
"How is it possible for those holding religious doctrines, some
based on religious authority, for example, the Church or the Bible,
to hold at the same time a reasonable political conception that
supports a reasonable constitutional democratic regime?"5
Although many religious worldviews can support democracy,
Rawls concludes that fundamentalisms, whether religious or
philosophical, are generally incompatible with liberal democracy,
and are "politically unreasonable."6  Politically unreasonable
groups test the limits of our tolerance.
According to Rawls, political liberalism is the theory that
emerges from the first original position, which is composed of
citizens of liberal societies who choose from behind the veil of
ignorance.7  Four central features of this political liberalism
explain why fundamentalism can be incompatible with democracy
and thus politically unreasonable. The Warriors of Religion in
Europe believed their religion was true, so they fought to establish
it as the religion of the state or prince. But Rawlsian liberals
accept (first) pluralism among people's comprehensive beliefs. To
fundamentalists who proclaim one truth, liberals respond that no
one comprehensive doctrine compels the allegiance of all citizens.
Pluralism is an abiding feature of our lives and will not fade.
Therefore, (second) a political conception of justice must be found
that does not impose one comprehensive doctrine (like
Catholicism, Kantianism or Islam) on one's fellow citizens. The
political conception of justice will be based on (third) an
overlapping consensus in which citizens can agree on the political
and constitutional essentials of their society, even though they
disagree about their comprehensive doctrines. Finally, decisions
within the overlapping consensus should be made only on the basis
of reasons that appeal to all citizens, and so citizens must employ
(fourth) public reason. Public reason means that citizens should
not appeal to comprehensive religious and philosophical doctrines
but to arguments that their fellow citizens may "reasonably be
expected to endorse."8
5 JOHN RAWLS, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, in COLLECTED PAPERS 573, 588
(Samuel Freeman ed., 1999) [hereinafter RAWLS, The Idea of Public Reason].
6 Id. at 613.
7 JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES 30 (1999).
8 RAWLS, supra note 1, at 225.
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These four features of political liberalism explain both the
tension between religion and democracy, as well as why toleration
is required in a liberal democracy. Believers instinctively want
their own comprehensive perspective to govern all aspects of life.
Yet pluralism renders this desire impossible, unless force is used to
impose one's views on another. Instead of inflicting their views on
others, citizens should meet on the common ground of political
justice, an independent "module" shared by all. Toleration of
different perspectives "mitigates" the "conflict between
democracy and reasonable religious doctrines."9  Instead of
establishing one comprehensive doctrine, liberalism recognizes a
constitutional right of religious liberty and defends a purely
political conception of justice in which religious doctrines are not
imposed on citizens. Rawls concludes "that a reasonable
comprehensive doctrine accepts some form of the political
argument for toleration."1
Rawls asserts that his modem vision of liberalism "completes
and extends" the old principle of toleration that arose from the
Wars of Religion in Europe.1 Toleration offered only a modus
vivendi and was inherently unstable. Although it put an end to
war, the principle of toleration allowed for the possibility that
groups would wait until they gained more members, and then use
their power to build a society that was consistent with their
comprehensive doctrine. Such tolerant societies, in which groups
were always waiting for the opportunity to impose their views on
others, were never stable. Modern democracies require more, and
so Rawls argues that consensus should replace toleration. Today,
citizens need a political, overlapping consensus that does not shift
as religions gain adherents. Such consensus provides social
stability, which has "very 'great value.""' 2  Imposing one's
comprehensive view upsets stability, and so is (morally) forbidden
in a constitutional democracy. This means that the political
conception of justice has to be "affirmed by citizens irrespective of
the political strength of their comprehensive view."'3
Some comprehensive doctrines simply cannot accept
toleration, consensus, a political conception of justice, or
democracy. "[F]undamentalist religious doctrines.., will reject
the ideas of public reason and deliberative democracy. They will
9 RAWLS, The Idea of Public Reason, supra note 5, at 611.
10 Id. at 612.
11 JOHN RAWLS, The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus, in COLLECTED PAPERS 421,
437 (Samuel Freeman ed., 1999); see also RAWLS, supra note 1, at 154.
12 RAWLS, supra note 1, at 139.
13 RAWLS, JUSTICE, supra note 4, at 1.
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say that democracy leads to a culture contrary to their religion ....
They assert that the religiously true, or the philosophically true,
overrides the politically reasonable."'' 4 Rawls "simply say[s]" that
such doctrines are "politically unreasonable."' 5 They challenge the
stability of democratic institutions by their intolerance.
Who are these politically unreasonable fundamentalists? The
term "fundamentalism" has its origins in American Protestantism,
from The Fundamentals: A Testimony to the Truth, a series of
essays about the Bible and Christian faith, which was distributed
widely between 1910 and 1915. "The term fundamentalist itself
was coined by Baptist editor Curtis Lee Laws in 1920 as a
designation for those who were ready 'to do battle royal for the
Fundamentals.""' 6  Those Fundamentalists are remembered for
their opposition to evolution.
In the 1990s, an era of resurgent fundamentalism, the
Fundamentalism Project sought a definition of fundamentalism
that could apply to all religions across the world, not only
Christianity or American Protestantism. Among the numerous
features of fundamentalism, I emphasize five: 1) its opposition to
modernity; 2) its selective appropriation of the past; 3) its
totalitarian impulse; 4) its "pronounced" commitment to
patriarchy; and 5) its militancy.'7 About modernity, (first)
fundamentalists dislike especially "the adoption of religious
tolerance with [its] accompanying tendencies toward relativism.' 18
What the Enlightenment philosophers and Rawls praised as
tolerance, consensus and pluralism, the fundamentalists condemn
as immoral relativism and godless secularism. Fundamentalists
prefer the past to the modern, but their ideal is usually (second) a
"selective" history of the past, adopted in support of their anti-
modern and anti-feminist ideology." "[F]undamentalism has
proven itself selectively traditional and selectively modern."2 It
uses modern technology, for example, to pursue traditional goals.
Third, "fundamentalists seek to replace existing structures with a
14 RAWLS, The Idea of Public Reason, supra note 5, at 613.
15 Id.
16 MARK A. NOLL, A HISTORY OF CHRISTIANITY IN THE UNITED STATES AND
CANADA 382-83 (1992); see also George M. Marsden, Introduction to THE
FUNDAMENTALS: A TESTIMONY TO TRUTH I1 (George M. Marsden ed., 1988).
17 Introduction to FUNDAMENTALISMS AND SOCIETY: RECLAIMING THE SCIENCES,
THE FAMILY, AND EDUCATION 10 (Martin E. Marty & R. Scott Appleby eds., 1993).
18 Introduction to FUNDAMENTALISMS OBSERVED, at vii (Martin E. Marty & R. Scott
Appleby eds., 1991) (emphasis added).
19 Id. at ix.
20 Martin E. Marty & R. Scott Appleby, Conclusion: An Interim Report on a
Hypothetical Family, in FUNDAMENTALISMS OBSERVED 814, 825 (Martin E. Marty & R.
Scott Appleby eds., 1991).
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comprehensive system.' '2' In Rawlsian terms, they want their
comprehensive doctrine to provide the complete structure for
state, society and family, replacing the liberal institutions of the
modern democratic state with one ideology. They are totalitarian
in seeking social institutions that reflect their complete perspective
on life and modernity. Fourth, fundamentalist groups are usually
led by "charismatic and authoritarian male leaders" who support
patriarchy rather than equality.22 Because it is easier to control
families than states, to date their biggest successes have occurred
in preserving and protecting a traditional role for women in the
family. 3
Fifth, finally, and fundamentally, comes militancy. In
common with the American Protestant fundamentalists, all
fundamentalists do "battle royal," "fighting back" because their
core identity is threatened by modernity.24 Fighting defines them.
They "fight back" against modernity. They "fight for" the
restoration of their comprehensive worldview. They "fight with"
the selective resources of the past and the modern technology that
ensures their success. They "fight against" the moderates,
modernists and secular humanists who oppose their total vision.
They "fight under" God or "some transcendent reference. 25
These features constitute the type of anti-liberalism that
Rawls deplored. Fundamentalists are believers in one truth who
fight to impose that truth on their fellow citizens through the
control of social and political institutions-and so are politically
unreasonable. In their voices, Rawlsian liberals hear echoes of
their intolerant kin who decimated Europe in the Wars of
Religion.
In retrospect, the Protestant Fundamentals texts of 1910
appear quite moderate, pale precursors of the Fundamentalism of
the twentieth century's end. This suggests an important distinction
between theological and political fundamentalism. A theological
return to basic tenets of faith is quite different from a
fundamentalist movement. Historically, "leaders of such
fundamentalist movements [have not been] theologians but [were]
social thinkers and political activists."26  In Rawls' terms,
theological fundamentalists could have biblical or religious reasons
to support democratic institutions. If they do so, they are
21 Id. at 824.
22 Id. at 826.
23 See supra note 17, at 5.
2A See supra note 18, at ix.
2 Id. at x.
26 Marty & Appleby, supra note 20.
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reasonable. The political fundamentalists, for whom "pluralism is
not an option, ' 27 are not reasonable because they impose their
system on others whenever the opportunity arises. This
theological and political mix complicates their role in a democracy.
"While they are political in nature, fundamentalist movements are
also genuinely religious, which puts them in an analytical category
distinct from other social protest movements or political
opposition parties. We will fail to understand these movements if
we neglect their irreducible religious dimension. "28
How shall citizens of a liberal democracy treat those who are
politically unreasonable? Does justice require the toleration of the
intolerant? No, says Rawls, if they threaten our security and
public order. But if they "are of no immediate danger to the equal
liberties of others, '29 then the intolerant should be tolerated, not
suppressed. One reason for this conclusion is Rawls' hope that
"[t]he liberties of the intolerant may persuade them to a belief in
freedom."3 However, some intolerant sects "may be so strong" or
"grow[] so fast" that they do not learn the lessons of liberty.31
Their liberty may be limited if they pose a threat to the liberty or
equality of others, i.e., "only in the special cases when it is
necessary for preserving equal liberty itself."3 For Rawls, such
cases "present[] a practical dilemma which philosophy alone
cannot resolve."33 Therein lies the unresolved (or irresoluble?)
dilemma about liberalism and the fundamentalists:
"[u]nreasonable doctrines are a threat to democratic
institutions. '34
Recall that the theory of political liberalism arises from the
first original position, and proposes an internal, political
conception of justice for liberal societies. Rawls employs a second
original position to identify an ideal philosophical account of
international law-the Law of Peoples-that is adopted by the
"Society of Peoples."35 Members of the Society of Peoples follow
27 Rhys H. Williams, Movement Dynamics and Social Change: Transforming
Fundamentalist Ideology and Organizations, in ACCOUNrING FOR FUNDAMENTALISMS:
THE DYNAMIC CHARACrER OF MOVEMENTS 785, 802 (Martin E. Marty & R. Scott
Appleby eds., 1994).
28 Gabriel A. Almond et al., Politics, Ethnicity, and Fundamentalism, in
FUNDAMENTALISMS COMPREHENDED 483, 504 (Martin E. Marty & R. Scott Appleby
eds., 1995).
29 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 192 (rev. ed. 1999).
3 Id.
31 id. at 193.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 RAWLS, The Idea of Public Reason, supra note 5, at 614.
35 RAWLS, supra note 7, at 3.
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the Law of Peoples. They are not required to have liberal
democratic governments, however. Instead, within international
relations, there is a pluralism of "cultures and traditions of
thought, both religious and nonreligious.' 36 Hence, the Society of
Peoples includes all "well-ordered peoples," namely liberal and
"decent but non-liberal" governments, but excludes groups who
are "outlaw states. 3 7 Reasonable pluralism exists among peoples,
as well as within liberal societies.
Decent, nonliberal societies do not have "aggressive aims"
against other peoples; if they seek to spread their influence
externally, they do so in a way that respects civil liberties. Under
this definition, the European Warriors of Religion were not
decent.38 Decent peoples respect human rights, possess a "decent
consultation hierarchy" that confers with representatives of their
society's groups, and allow dissent and exodus. They respect the
rights to life, liberty, property, formal equality, "and to a sufficient
measure of liberty of conscience to ensure freedom of religion and
thought."39 According to Rawls, this last right does not mandate
religious equality; a decent people may favor one religion, as long
as all religions have basic freedom. "Although the established
religion may have various privileges, it is essential to the society's
being decent that no religion be persecuted, or denied civic and
social conditions permitting its practice in peace and without
fear."4
Because of the pluralism of liberal and decent nonliberal
peoples, "the question of how far nonliberal peoples are to be
tolerated is an essential question of liberal foreign policy." Here
too, Rawls recommends tolerance unless security is at stake.
Liberal societies should demonstrate their respect for decent,
nonliberal societies.42  Once again, Rawls hopes that the
experience of toleration may eventually persuade the decent to
become liberal.
Religious peoples may be decent, or not. Neither the
European Warriors of Religion nor aggressive Fundamentalists
are decent. In contrast, Rawls' hypothetical hierarchical Islamic
people of Kazanistan are decent.43 Kazanistan lacks separation of
church and state, and favors Islam. Although non-Muslims have
36 Id. at 11.
37 Id. at 89-90.
8 Id. at 64-65.
39 Id. at 65.
40 Id. at 74.
41 Id. at 10.
42 Id. at 59.
43 Id. § 9.3.
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some religious freedom and basic civil rights there, government
positions are reserved for Muslims. Such a decent government is
part of the Society of Peoples and deserves tolerance. In contrast,
outlaw states that do not respect these "universal" human rights
should not be tolerated; the right of self-defense may be used
against them.
Fundamentalists are no more comfortable with the Law of
Peoples than they were with Political Liberalism.
Many persons-call them "fundamentalists" of various religious
or secular doctrines which have been historically dominant-
could not be reconciled to a social world such as I have
described. For them the social world envisaged by political
liberalism is a nightmare of social fragmentation and false
doctrines, if not positively evil.44
Fundamentalists cannot reconcile themselves to pluralism in either
national or international governments. In summary,
[T]he Law of Peoples uses an original position argument only
three times: twice for liberal societies (once at the domestic
level and once at the Law of Peoples level), but only once, at
the second level, for decent hierarchical societies. Only equal
parties can be symmetrically situated in an original position.5
There is no first original position in nonliberal societies that do not
have the full range of rights that are chosen by liberal states in the
first original position.
Post 9/11, it is clearer than ever that liberty and tolerance pose
practical dilemmas that "philosophy alone cannot resolve '46 at
either the national or international level. Hence, other speakers at
this conference wrestled with the difficult questions surrounding
the government's obligations to protect the nation's security and to
preserve individual liberties.47 The Society of Peoples now strives
to distinguish the real Kazanistans from the outlaw states and to
comprehend the varieties of the world's fundamentalisms.
Within the U.S., religious fundamentalism was resurgent in
domestic politics throughout the 1990s. Hence, within liberal
societies, there is good reason to remember and reiterate political
liberalism's enduring insight that all religious and philosophical
fundamentalisms are politically unreasonable. Today, the focus is
Islamic fundamentalism. Yet our analysis must not "prefer one
religion over another, '4 but should contemplate the risks all
fundamentalisms pose to liberal institutions. To emphasize this
44 Id. at 126.
45 Id. at 70.
46 RAWLS, supra note 29, at 193.
47 See, e.g., Richard Danzig, Academics and Bioterrorists: New Thinking About the New
Terror, 24 CARDoZO L. REV. 1497 (2003).
48 Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947).
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point, I turn to the history of American Catholicism to glean some
insight about the role of tolerance in our constitutional democracy
in the twenty-first century. I recount this history from the
perspective of liberal tolerance rather than from the internal
theological perspective of the Church, which was addressed by
another panel.
The Catholic Church was a leading participant in the
European Wars of Religion. Exhausted by warfare, it learned to
tolerate its losses of church land, church property and church
establishment to new governments across Europe. In some
nations, however, it retained the status of establishment. To cope
with these changes and the loss of political power, over time the
church developed an account of church-state relations that has
been summarized by the words "thesis" and "hypothesis." Thesis:
Catholicism is the one true religion. Therefore, it should be the
established religion of every nation. Non-Catholics should not
have the right to public worship because their religions are not
true. Hypothesis: Outside Catholic states, Catholics must enjoy
the right to public worship because their religion is true. Catholic
citizens must tolerate non-establishment when they can do no
better, but must change from non-establishment to establishment
whenever they acquire the power to do so.4 In other words, the
goal was to change the hypothesis to thesis.
This Catholic position illustrates the liberal concern about the
instability of toleration and the modus vivendi. A society cannot
be stable if its citizens change its institutions to match their religion
whenever they have the votes to do so.
American theologians and bishops challenged and changed
this Catholic teaching at the Second Vatican Council in 1965.
Their experience of the religious liberty protected by the First
Amendment persuaded them that the separation of church and
state was not an evil to be tolerated until it could be changed. In
the Declaration on Religious Freedom, the Council discarded the
thesis/hypothesis theory in favor of the argument that every
human person has a right to religious freedom that must be
protected by the state. The lead author of the Declaration, the
New York Jesuit John Courtney Murray, dismissed the old theory
of toleration as "archaic. '50 Toleration was for another era from
49 See generally John Courtney Murray, Current Theology: On Religious Freedom, 10
THEOLOGICAL STUD. 409 (1949); THOMAS T. LOVE, JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY:
CONTEMPORARY CHURCH-STATE THEORY 29-30 (1965).
50 John Courtney Murray, This Matter of Religious Freedom, AMERICA, Jan. 9,1965,
at 40, 42; see also John Courtney Murray, The Declaration on Religious Freedom, in 15
WAR, POVERTY, FREEDOM: THE CHRISTIAN RESPONSE 3, 16 (1966) ("Therefore, the
Declaration on Religious Freedom puts aside the post-Reformation and 19th-century
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the past; the new principle was freedom for everyone.
The Council's reform, rooted in the American experience of
religious freedom, exemplifies Rawls' hope that if the intolerant
are tolerated rather than suppressed, their experience of liberty
"may persuade them to a belief in freedom."'" The American
Catholic experience is also consistent with Rawls' summary of the
history of religious freedom: "Religious toleration has historically
first appeared as a modus vivendi between hostile faiths, later
becoming a moral principle shared by civilized peoples and
recognized by their leading religions. "52 At the Council, the
Catholic Church moved from the modus vivendi of toleration to
the moral principle of freedom.
The Council's Declaration on Religious Freedom also
addressed the issue of establishment that arises in the Society of
Peoples. It stated that both non-establishment and establishment
are acceptable forms of church-state interaction, as long as every
person possesses a civil right to religious freedom. 3 The Church
thus accepted a "pluralism of cultures and traditions" on questions
of church and state.
Murray noted that the only supporters of archaic tolerance at
the Council were the bishops who opposed any development of
church doctrine. People who oppose any development in
interpretation of texts are Fundamentalists. Although the majority
of Catholic bishops approved an engagement with the modern
world for the church at Vatican 11,1' opponents of modernity have
retained a powerful Catholic voice. Since 1965, they have battled
to limit the range and scope of the Council's reforms. Some of the
freedoms of the modern era--especially new freedoms for the laity
and women-have been simply unacceptable to traditional
Catholics. The Church, to borrow Michael Walzer's explanation
of toleration, has experienced a "contradiction... [that] lies deep
within the idea of religious toleration itself, because virtually all
the tolerated religions aim to restrict individual freedom, which is,
for liberals at least, the foundation of the idea. 5
As in many world religions or philosophies, in Catholicism
there are Fundamentalists who yearn for a return to a pre-modern
theory of civil tolerance. The fault is not error but archaism.").
51 RAWLS, supra note 29, at 192.
52 RAWLS, supra note 7, at 113.
53 Dignitatis Humanae (The Declaration on Religious Freedom), in THE DOCUMENTS
OF VATICAN II 675 (NO. 6) (Walter M. Abbott ed., 1966).
54 See Lumen Gentium (The Dogmatic Constitution on the Church in the Modern
World) and Gaudium et Spes (The Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern
World), in THE DOCUMENTS OF VATICAN 11 (Walter M. Abbott ed., 1966).
55 MICHAEL WALZER, ON TOLERATION 70-71 (1997).
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era when a patriarchal church decided the standards for state,
society and family. My own liberal opinion is that the late
twentieth century Reformation in technology, women's roles in
secular society and concepts of morality has led the current
American Catholic church to a new fundamentalism with a new
thesis and hypothesis. The new thesis: Catholicism offers the one
true morality, which should be established as the law. The new
hypothesis: When the law does not reflect Catholic moral values, it
must be changed. Hence, the vigorous public campaign by the
church over the last thirty years to change American law to reflect
Catholic teaching on moral questions such as abortion,
homosexuality, contraception, welfare and reproductive
technologies. A stark conflict exists between this comprehensive
doctrine that opposes women's equality and a civil society where
the laws require it. The equality of women is a prerequisite of a
liberal society; such equality would be agreed upon in the first
original position. 6
It is no coincidence that the Catholic conflict occurs over
women's rights. A common feature of all Fundamentalisms-not
only that practiced by the Taliban-is the "pronounced"
commitment to patriarchy. Indeed, the Fundamentalism Project
concluded that, although fundamentalists (as totalists) seek to
reform the state, politics and all social institutions, "with a few
important exceptions, [they] have expended the greater portion of
their energies, and have enjoyed the greater success, in reclaiming
the intimate zones of life," namely the family. 7 There, they "can
shape behavior according to specific norms and traditional
patterns, with relatively little resistance."58 This emphasis on
inequality is troubling to Rawlsian liberalism (and democracy)
because the family is part of the basic structure of a liberal society.
In a liberal state, "[n]o institution or association.., can violate
[women's] rights as citizens."59  Hence, Rawlsian liberals are
critical of religious groups who "t[ake] advantage of the openness
of secular democracies"6 to shape family law (not only their own
families) to reflect their fundamentalist beliefs. Fundamentalists
who seek to impose their opposition to women's rights on their
fellow citizens by force of law are politically unreasonable.
This American Catholic experience of conflict between the
church's teaching and civil law, plus reluctance to tolerate despite
56 RAWLS, The Idea of Public Reason, supra note 5, at 598.
57 Supra note 17, at 5.
5 Id. at 7.
59 RAWLS, The Idea of Public Reason, supra note 5, at 598.
60 Marty & Appleby, supra note 20, at 828.
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the official endorsement of toleration, may confirm Michael
Walzer's observation of the inevitable discomfort of religious
groups with tolerance. A "regime of toleration" threatens their
identities:
[T]his regime of toleration is under pressure in the
contemporary United States from groups within the (Christian)
majority who have no quarrel with the freedom of assembly or
worship but fear the loss of social control. They are prepared to
tolerate minority religions (they are advocates, therefore, of
religious liberty), but they have no tolerance for personal
liberty outside the house of worship. If sectarian communities
aim to control the behavior of their own people, the more
extreme members of religious majorities aim to control
everyone's behavior-in the name of a supposedly common
(Judeo-Christian, say) tradition, of 'family values,' or of their
own certainties about what is right and wrong. This is surely an
example of religious intolerance. It is a sign of the partial
success of the regime of toleration, however, that antagonism is
not directed against particular minority religions but rather
against the ambience of freedom that the regime as a whole
creates.6
9/11 focused the world's attention on the Taliban's brutal
campaign against basic human and civil rights for women. After
the attacks, for example, the European Parliament passed a
resolution on Women and Fundamentalism. It noted that women
have been among the "main victims" of fundamentalists and
asserted that women's legal rights "cannot be restricted or
breached on the pretext of religion." A Vatican spokesman,
Roberto Cardinal Tucci, immediately objected to the resolution
because it "would enable governments to impose on churches what
they should believe and live."62 Once again, we see a stark contrast
between the comprehensive doctrine and civil law. As a matter of
religious freedom, within its comprehensive doctrine, the Catholic
Church does not want to "believe and live" with women's rights.
For that reason, Cardinal Tucci characterized the European
Parliament's resolution as "exasperated laicism" and an "example
of 'lay fundamentalism."'63
Lay fundamentalism? Like any other comprehensive
doctrine, Liberalism can be fundamentalist. For this reason, in
Political Liberalism, Rawls rejected a political structure based on
61 WALZER, supra note 55, at 70 (emphasis added).
62 'Lay Fundamentalism' Seen in European Parliament Action, Mar. 15, 2002, available
at http://www.zenit.org.
61 Id.
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"comprehensive liberalism"' in favor of a political conception of
justice developed by an overlapping consensus of citizens of
different worldviews. Neither Liberals nor Catholics may impose
their comprehensive doctrine on their fellow citizens; both must
employ public reason. Not even John Rawls may use Kant's
categorical imperative to argue questions of constitutional
essentials. Moreover, under the Rawlsian standard, Catholics may
justly criticize liberal fundamentalists who would establish
comprehensive liberalism.
The Cardinal's "lay fundamentalism" is not liberal
fundamentalism, however. Cardinal Tucci is mistaken to criticize
"lay fundamentalism" in the European Parliament's discussion of
women's rights. The Cardinal's criticism echoes American
Christians who decry the establishment of "secular humanism" in
place of their own fundamentalism. Rawls insists, however, that
"although the Law of Peoples, like political liberalism, is strictly
political, it is not secular"65 or lay. It is political. Period. The
"laicism" and "lay fundamentalism" criticized by the Vatican are
in fact the political and legal (i.e., non-theological or theocratic)
principles of government that remain the valuable and abiding
legacy of the Wars of Religion and the principle of toleration.
Democracies are governed by common political principles,
including the equality of men and women. Such equality must be
part of the political conception of justice in a liberal society,
despite what the world's religions "believe and live."
The legacy of liberal tolerance is the understanding that
democracies cannot be governed by religious principles.
Accordingly, liberals must oppose efforts to turn religious
convictions into law and to re-Christianize our public discourse.
This recommendation will appear harsh to some believers who feel
bracketed or excluded from, or trivialized in, the public square
because of their religion. But fairness to religion does not require
that the "politically unreasonable" shape our laws and policies to
fundamentalist ends.' As Walzer has explained, tolerant societies
respect "minorities, where collective identity can be cultivated and
pressures to assimilate resisted. And liberal democrats can accept
both the cultivation and the resistance, within limits, until that
point (whose location is always disputed) where the associations
threaten to repress individual members or diminish their republican
64 RAWLS, supra note 1, at xxxix (emphasis added).
65 RAWLS, supra note 7, at 104 n.30.
66 See, e.g., John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, 64 U. CHI. L. REv. 765,
806 (1997); RAWLS, supra note 1, at 197 ("No society can include within itself all forms of
life.").
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commitment."67
The Wars of Religion persuaded liberal democrats of both the
necessity of toleration and its limits. Toleration is unsatisfactory in
so many ways. From their different comprehensive doctrines,
Rawls and Murray articulated the inadequacies of toleration for a
modern democracy. The modus vivendi of toleration did not fully
protect either social stability or freedom. Rawls replaced
toleration with consensus, while Murray favored the freedom of
the human person. Moreover, on the religious side, as T.S. Eliot
remarked, "'[t]he Christian does not wish to be tolerated."'68
Many tolerated religions echo Eliot because "[t]oleration is always
mere toleration. It is less than equality just as it is distinct from
liberty."69 Maurice Cranston interpreted Eliot's comment to mean
that "[t]he Christian wanted something better-to be respected,
honored, and loved."7
The desire for respect, honor and love runs deep in human
nature, as does the quest for meaning. Religions address those
needs. In recent years, resurgent religious fundamentalism has
met them most effectively by supplying a comprehensive system
that governs all aspects of life, including law and politics. Liberal
tolerance offers much less, and much more. It cannot cure
"spiritual emptiness."' "[S]piritual well-being ... is not
guaranteed"7 in a liberal state because the political conception of
justice is political, not theological, religious or philosophical.
Liberal tolerance can provide the "very great value[]" 3 of a stable
society in which religious freedom is exercised publicly and
privately, but not politically.
Preserving stability requires consensus on public reason rather
than a modus vivendi of warring factions. Consensus depends on
the commitment of citizens to employ arguments that others may
"reasonably be expected to endorse."74  Although the enduring
strength of Fundamentalism "indicates that there are limits to
what public reason can accomplish," for Rawlsian liberals "[i]t
does not diminish the great value and importance of attempting to
realize that ideal to the fullest extent possible."
67 WALZER, supra note 55, at 85 (emphasis added).
(8 Maurice Cranston, Toleration, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 143 (Paul
Edwards ed., 1967) (quoting T.S. Eliot).691d.70 d.71RAwLS, supra note 7, at 127.
72 Id.
73 RAWLS, supra note 1, at 139.
74 Id. (emphasis added).
75 RAWLS, The Idea of Public Reason, supra note 5, at 614.
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